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 Reflecting on a Legacy 
Jamie Cameron* 
Bertha Wilson’s journey was storied, if unlikely in certain ways. She 
was the Scottish minister’s wife who immigrated to Canada and many 
years later became the first woman to sit on the Supreme Court of 
Canada. She arrived at the Court momentously, in time to witness the 
historic repatriation of Canada’s Constitution and enactment of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.1 Bertha Wilson was not 
impelled to law school in the 1950s by focus or ambition, nor did she 
aspire to the judiciary. She did not seek out the powers and 
responsibilities of judicial office, but was chosen for public service. Yet 
if she found judicial decision-making lonely, it was also a source of 
immense fulfillment for her: first at the Ontario Court of Appeal and 
then at the Supreme Court of Canada, where she was, truly and 
quintessentially, a “faithful steward of the law”.2 
Bertha Wilson reported being daunted — and humbled — by the 
hopes and expectations that were prompted by her judicial appointments, 
and she spoke, too, of the apprehension she and others felt at being 
called upon to interpret the Charter. If Justice Wilson was intimidated by 
the challenges she faced at the Supreme Court of Canada, there is little 
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 Bertha Wilson was appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada in March 1982 and sworn 
in on March 30, 1982; the Constitution Act, 1982 and Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
were enacted on April 17, 1982; see Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
2
 At the time, she declared herself “a true servant of the law” and expressed her trust that 
“within the collegial structure of this national Court I can be a faithful steward of the best of our legal 
heritage”; “Response of Madame Justice Wilson”, Swearing-in at the Supreme Court of Canada 
(March 30, 1982), in Speeches Delivered by the Honourable Bertha Wilson [unpublished volume, 
available at the Supreme Court of Canada Library] 15, at 18 [hereinafter “Wilson Speeches”]. 
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evidence of it in her jurisprudence. In a relatively short period of time — 
from 1982 to early 1991 — she generated a body of jurisprudence that is 
distinctively Wilsonian. This body of work, along with the leadership 
roles she assumed in post-judicial assignments, has made her an icon of 
Canadian law.3 
Events would determine that Justice Wilson could not simply be a 
judge, a woman judge, or even the first woman judge at the Supreme 
Court of Canada. Rather, she was remade in the image of those who 
sanctified her as a feminist and activist, or demonized her for similar 
reasons. While many were quick to claim and applaud her as a feminist 
judge, she was too feminist for some and not feminist enough for others. 
To be feminist in any way or at all reflected negatively — in certain 
quarters — on perceptions of Justice Wilson’s capacity to decide cases 
impartially. In addition, she was seen by some as a judicial activist — 
one who inappropriately promotes the powers of courts by substituting 
subjective preferences for the policy choices of democratically elected 
representatives. Her Charter decisions were resisted by those who 
harboured doubts about the wisdom of adopting constitutional rights and 
fretted about the Charter’s consequences for Canada’s tradition of 
parliamentary supremacy. 
Formal and reserved, Justice Wilson was “not exactly modest”, but 
neither did she call attention to herself.4 In her Scottish way, she 
projected “a strenuous dignity and control, a sort of refusal ... to feel any 
need to turn [her] life into a story, either for other people or for 
[herself]”.5 Though she resisted the labels she considered unfair — labels 
that did not reflect who she thought she was or who she wanted to be — 
the perceptions which define her image have been persistent. As she 
once remarked, “[w]e tend to see what we want to see and our 
perceptions are coloured accordingly.”6  
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 Bertha Wilson was Chair of the Canadian Bar Association’s national Task Force on 
Gender Equality, which produced the “Touchstones” Report: Touchstones for Change: Equality, 
Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1993). She also served, tirelessly, 
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Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, which was issued in November 1996, comprised five 
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4
 Alice Munro, “No Advantages”, in The View From Castle Rock (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart Ltd., 2006), at 20 (explaining that “self-dramatization” got short shrift in the families of 
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Already Justice Wilson has been the subject of a biography,7 an 
academic symposium8 and much commentary.9 Yet she fascinates us 
still. It may be that “[t]here are some stories which have to be retold by 
each generation … because of some queer quality in them which makes 
them not only [that person’s] story but our own.”10 Hers are the stories 
— the challenges, victories and defeats — of a generation of women in 
the profession, not to mention activists and scholars, and men as well as 
women, who came of age when Wilson and the Charter arrived at the 
Court. “The instability of human knowledge is one of our few 
certainties” — lives are changed in retrospect, and “almost nothing we 
are told remains the same when retold.”11 In Justice Wilson’s case, the 
positions which were once staked so forcefully may be less compelling 
today, and may have lost some of their sting.  
This collection offers diverse reflections on Bertha Wilson’s legacy 
by a strong and diverse group of scholars which includes some of her 
law clerks.12 The contributors are a deliberate mix of men and women 
from different generations, who work in different fields of law and 
approach her legacy from distinctive perspectives. Though these 
reflections take the form of a tribute to Justice Wilson, who died in April 
2007, the authors are aware of the tendency for biographical and legacy 
scholarship to treat its subject as a “faultless hero”.13 As Felix 
Frankfurter once observed, in commenting on the praise of famous men, 
“[i]t is for our sake that we are to praise them, for … they have given us 
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 Ellen Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson: Law as Large as Life (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001) [hereinafter “Judging Bertha Wilson”]. 
8
 See “The Democratic Intellect: A Symposium to Honour the Contributions of Madame 
Justice Bertha Wilson” (1992) 15 Dal. L.J.  
9
 For a critical analysis of Justice Wilson’s legacy, see Robert E. Hawkins & Robert 
Martin, “Democracy, Judging and Bertha Wilson” (1995) 41 McGill L.J. 1. 
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 Hermione Lee, Virginia Woolf (United Kingdom, Vintage, 1996), at 769 (quoting Woolf, 
discussing Shelley).  
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 Janet Malcolm, Gertrude and Alice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), at 186. 
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 Former clerks who are contributors include Philip Bryden (1984-85), Tanya Lee (1987-
88), Kent Roach (1989-90), and Robert Yalden (1990 and 1991). 
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 Philip B. Kurland, “Judicial Biography: History, Myth, Literature, Fiction, Potpourri” 
(1995) 70 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 489, at 500 (Symposium on Judicial Biography). See also Jamie 
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Society in the 21st Century: Transformations, Resistance, Futures”, Humboldt University, July 26, 
2007]. 
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an ‘inheritance’.”14 And as Hugo Black noted, “[t]o be wholly neutral, 
[for instance] in discussion of slavery, would probably be rather 
boring.”15 The articles in this collection are not especially critical of 
Justice Wilson, but nor are they unguarded in praise of her contributions. 
Each seeks, in its own way, to do “justice to [her] achievements without 
obscuring [her] complexities”.16  
These reflections do not offer commentary on all aspects of Justice 
Wilson’s professional life, nor is the treatment of her Supreme Court 
jurisprudence comprehensive. The collection considers the nature of her 
contributions to family law, torts and criminal law, as well as to 
administrative law and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
More vital than what the authors say about Justice Wilson’s influence on 
legal doctrine are their ideas about her conception of judicial role and 
how she impressed her views of what justice requires on the Court’s 
jurisprudence, across a range of issues. 
Looking at the nature and scope of Justice Wilson’s body of work is 
an obvious starting point, and the collection offers an invaluable 
“empirical snapshot” of her jurisprudence. In “Voicing an Opinion” 
Marie-Claire Belleau, Rebecca Johnson and Christina Vinters count 
cases and provide graphs which sort Justice Wilson’s judicial work by 
the type of opinion she wrote (i.e., unanimous, majority, dissenting, 
partially dissenting, concurring) and her method of participation (i.e., 
signing versus authoring an opinion).17 Their empirical work is enriched, 
in a second part of the article, by their analysis and reflections on points 
of institutional ethnography, which probe the meaning and significance 
of voice, authorship and collaboration in the production of judicial 
opinions. “Voicing an Opinion” is complemented by a table of cases, 
which appears as an appendix, and provides a coded chart of Justice 
Wilson’s decisions by year.18 
                                                                                                             
14
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 J. Woodford Howard, Jr., “Objectivity and Hagiography” (1995) 70 N.Y.U. Law Rev. 
533, at 547. 
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 Nicola Lacey, A Life of H.L.A. Hart: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream (United 
Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2004), at xix (speaking of Hart). 
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 Marie-Claire Belleau, Rebecca Johnson & Christina Vinters, “Voicing an Opinion: 
Authorship, Collaboration and the Judgments of Justice Bertha Wilson” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 53. 
18
 See “Appendix A” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 409, prepared by Marie-Claire Belleau, 
Rebecca Johnson, Christina Vinters and Andrew Tomilson. 
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Bertha Wilson’s relationship with feminism is a vital part of her 
legacy which invites further examination and discussion. Justice Wilson 
signalled her ambivalence in 1985 when, in the first interview she ever 
granted, she described herself as a “moderate feminist”, before adding 
that she had “little patience with feminists who demand that she use her 
position on the court to battle for women’s rights”.19 Sternly, she 
announced that “if I went around making speeches and displaying a bias 
it would make me completely useless as a judge”.20 Ironically, the very 
allegation which was unimaginable to her — that she was biased because 
of her feminism — would repeatedly be made against Justice Wilson, at 
formal and informal levels, in the years that followed. Against the 
weight of consensus, and for reasons that remain unknown, late in life 
Bertha Wilson was moved to disclose — through her biographer — that 
she was not a feminist at all.21 
Because it was so incontrovertibly assumed that she was a feminist, 
Justice Wilson’s disavowal came as a surprise and presented a puzzle. 
Mary Jane Mossman’s article, “‘Contextualizing’ Bertha Wilson” 
provides an analysis that might explain, in part, why Justice Wilson was 
uneasy with feminism, and unwilling to embrace it.22 In exploring how 
women like Bertha Wilson coped in a profession that set so many 
barriers for women, Mossman concludes that to succeed in the 
profession it was necessary for Justice Wilson and her proximate 
contemporaries to take ungendered stances: to insist on being a lawyer 
rather than a woman lawyer. By doing so, they positioned themselves for 
advancement at a time when the “gatekeepers” were under pressure to 
appoint women to the judiciary. Constance Backhouse continues the 
discussion of Justice Wilson’s feminism by examining the role of self-
identification in considering who is or is not a feminist. She shows that 
much in Bertha Wilson’s career was influenced by feminism, that she 
advanced women’s rights in important ways and that she promoted 
opportunities for women in the profession. Backhouse concludes that “it 
would be a mark of the greatest respect to identify Justice Bertha Wilson 
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 Anderson, Judging Bertha Wilson, supra, note 7, at 134 and 135-36 (stating that Wilson 
was “avowedly not a feminist”, and “most emphatically does not consider herself to be a feminist”). 
22
 Mary Jane Mossman, “‘Contextualizing’ Bertha Wilson: Wilson as a Woman in Law in 
Mid-20th Century Canada” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 1. 
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as a feminist, both as a tribute to her legacy and as a tribute to the 
feminist movement itself.”23 
As mentioned above, Justice Wilson’s activism has been so 
controversial over the years that it is almost legendary in status. From 
that perspective, it is striking that several articles independently come to 
the conclusion that her approach to decision-making was fundamentally 
pragmatic — in the sense of being informed by a perceptive awareness 
of the limits of the law and of the need for judges to address the 
dynamics of change with sensitivity and humility. For instance, Colleen 
Sheppard finds significant evidence of feminist pragmatism in her 
jurisprudence: an approach that combined Justice Wilson’s pragmatic 
awareness of context and the constraints of social realities with the 
commitment to equality which is at the heart of feminist theory.24 As 
Sheppard explains, Justice Wilson’s “awareness of the imperfect choices 
at the heart of judging prompted her to insist that we be vigilant in 
continuing to question, to reconsider, to seek to develop the law to create 
and recreate moments of justice in a constantly changing world”.25 From 
a less explicitly feminist perspective, Kate Sutherland focuses on the 
roles of precedent, principle and pragmatism in Justice Wilson’s torts 
jurisprudence and reaches similar conclusions. For her, Justice Wilson 
cannot be easily characterized, though her nuanced and contextualized 
liberalism — which blended principle with pragmatism and infused 
autonomy with equality — makes her a “cautious optimist about the 
progressive potential of tort law”.26  
Some contributors, like Robert Leckey and Philip Bryden, take a 
longer view of Justice Wilson’s work in particular areas. In “What Is 
Left of Pelech?”, Leckey challenges the standard critique of the Pelech 
trilogy, which is offered by feminists, in the main — that her opinions 
inappropriately privatized the family — for obscuring the trilogy’s 
important public dimensions.27 The dynamics of the Pelech debate and 
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 Constance Backhouse, “Justice Bertha Wilson and the Politics of Feminism” (2008) 41 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 33, at 52. 
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 Colleen Sheppard, “Feminist Pragmatism in the Work of Justice Bertha Wilson” (2008) 
41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 83.  
25
 Id., at 101. 
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 Kate Sutherland, “Precedent, Principle and Pragmatism: Justice Wilson and the 
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 Robert Leckey, “What Is Left of Pelech?” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. (2d) 103 [hereinafter 
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the rapid re-conceptualization of family relations in recent years speak to 
Leckey of larger themes which engage “the uncertainties of legal 
judgment, the variability of the conditions in which texts are read and 
interpreted, and the complexity and unpredictability of the life of 
ideas”.28 In the end he reminds us that, although she was surely criticized 
at the time, Justice Wilson was “soberly aware”, in her pragmatic 
wisdom, of “the limits on the powers of judges and lawyers to remake 
the world”.29  
Likewise, Philip Bryden draws on Bertha Wilson’s concurrence in 
National Corn Growers Assn. v. Canada (Import Tribunal) to provide a 
retrospective comment on her contributions to administrative law.30 He 
does not identify Corn Growers as a highlight in her judicial career or 
claim that she provided a “fully satisfactory” view of judicial review of 
decision-making by administrative tribunals.31 Rather, Bryden’s detailed 
analysis of administrative law from Corn Growers to the present shows 
how the Wilson concurrence retains vitality, as a source of debate. 
Bryden regards this as a testament to “the power of her expression of her 
insights” and concludes that for fostering debate — in administrative law 
as well as in other areas of law — Canadians “owe her a profound debt 
of gratitude”.32 
Bertha Wilson had no experience of criminal law before being 
appointed, and readily voiced her uncertainty in addressing questions of 
criminal responsibility. Nonetheless, she generated an impressive body 
of decisions at the Supreme Court, in Charter and non-Charter settings, 
which were highly protective of the accused’s interests on matters of 
substantive and procedural law. Benjamin Berger explores this aspect of 
her legacy from the perspective that criminal judgment has always been 
a fearful event.33 For that reason, he says that we should want judges 
who are seized with a keen sense of the limits and consequences of the 
criminal law: judges who bring a due measure of fear to the task and 
tremble at the moment of judgment.34 His article explains why Justice 
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 Id., at 129. 
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 [1990] S.C.J. No. 110, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1324 (S.C.C.). Philip Bryden, “Justice Wilson’s 
Administrative Law Legacy: The National Corn Growers Decision and Judicial Review of 
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 Benjamin L. Berger, “A Due Measure of Fear in Criminal Judgment” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 161. 
34
 Id., at 165. 
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Wilson was such a judge. In discussing some of her best-known 
decisions, Berger describes her as a judge “who is palpably aware of the 
complexities of the lives that appear before her in a criminal case, [of] 
the violence of the criminal law, and [of] the consequent ethical 
imperative to proceed with caution and humility”.35 He concludes that 
her responses — “rich with a sense of the need for caution and humility 
in the use of the criminal law” — are “an ethical resource to which we 
can turn and a voice of conscience that we ought to heed”.36  
Kent Roach also writes about Justice Wilson’s contributions to the 
criminal law, but draws as well from Charter jurisprudence in 
characterizing her as a classically liberal judge.37 Without discounting 
her work on behalf of women or her compassion for the disadvantaged, 
he singles out “steadfast commitment to the principles of classical 
liberalism that protected individuals in all their individuality from the 
state” as Justice Wilson’s most distinctive and important contribution.38 
Roach ends on a note of regret that that so few judges today are willing 
— especially on questions of criminal responsibility — to follow in the 
footsteps of a woman who served “as a principled conscience for liberal 
values that are an important part of our heritage”.39  
Bertha Wilson had the privilege of sitting on the Court when the 
Charter arrived, and she addressed the task of Charter interpretation with 
vigour, conscience and painstaking care. Tanya Lee’s discussion of 
Charter interpretation in the early years recaptures the sense of the 
moment — the excitement, trepidation and uncertainty of decision-
making when “everything was unknown and anything was possible”.40 
Lee offers an extensive review of the challenges the Court faced as well 
as the choices that had to be made, at the level of interpretation, in 
pivotal cases. Lee’s overview of this critical period in the Charter’s early 
history isolates and underscores the vital role Justice Wilson played in 
creating a framework of analysis for adjudication.  
Meanwhile, Robert Yalden singles out a few significant decisions to 
offer an insider’s perspective on Justice Wilson’s approach to decision-




 Id., at 190 and 192. 
37
 Kent Roach, “Justice Bertha Wilson: A Classically Liberal Judge” (2008) 41 S.C.L.R. 
(2d) 193. 
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 Id., at 222. 
39
 Id., at 223. 
40
 Tanya Lee, “Justice Wilson and the Charter: An Engagement to Keep” (2008) 41 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 263, at 264. 
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making.41 Rather than join issue on the question of her activism, he 
presents a “more textured discussion” which shows how conscious 
Justice Wilson was of the constraints of her role and how unremittingly 
methodical she was with each and every decision. As he explains, Bertha 
Wilson put “extraordinary pressure” on herself and her clerks to prepare 
judgments that set out analytic tools that would provide useful guidance 
in subsequent decisions. Yalden’s account of his clerking experience not 
only provides insights into key decisions but also attests, in endearing 
but dispassionate terms, to the work ethic and professionalism of Justice 
Wilson’s chambers. 
Adam Dodek considers Justice Wilson’s approach to the relationship 
between rights and their limits in an article he titles, “The Dutiful 
Conscript: An Originalist View of Justice Wilson’s Conception of 
Charter Rights”.42 He makes the perceptive — if heretical — suggestion 
that Justice Wilson’s conception of the Charter was originalist in a 
certain way, in being rooted in the events of 1980-82 and the democratic 
choice that was made to create constitutional rights enforced by judicial 
review. Dodek shows how Justice Wilson made sense of a structural 
framework that created an analytical separation between the Charter’s 
rights and freedoms, and their reasonable limits under section 1. Section 
1 and the Oakes test are the centrepiece of an article which concludes 
that Justice Wilson fulfilled her duty as she saw it — “fidelity to the 
strictness of the Oakes framework which she believed correctly 
encapsulated the transformative purpose of the Charter project”.43 Dodek 
muses that her jurisprudential outlook serves as a reminder of “what the 
Charter’s destiny might have been and perhaps what is still possible one 
day”.44  
Jamie Cameron’s article is the last in the collection. She finds it 
striking that Justice Wilson, who spoke predominantly from the minority 
position, came to exercise tremendous influence over the Charter’s 
interpretation.45 Her discussion explores the power of certain concurring 
opinions but comments, as well, on how utterly unique Justice Wilson 
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was as a judge. Despite disagreeing with many of her substantive 
positions, Cameron admires Justice Wilson for having the courage and 
the will to “act singly” whenever she thought there was a point of 
principle at stake. For Cameron, the hallmark of Justice Wilson’s legacy 
is that she was, at all times and without reservation, a justice in her own 
right.  
Whatever their tenure may be, all justices of the Supreme Court of 
Canada have a legacy. That said, some legacies are more storied, more 
serendipitous, more timely, than others. For the reasons that are explored 
in this volume, Justice Wilson’s legacy is especially rich. As Tanya Lee 
put it so simply and yet so well: Bertha Wilson had an engagement to 
keep with history. The reflections we offer in this collection are not 
definitive: Justice Wilson’s place in history will be understood in 
different ways, at different points and places in time, by different 
commentators.46 In these pages we have reflected on Bertha Wilson’s 
legacy as thoughtfully, faithfully and honestly as possible; we hope, 
within the limits of our understanding, that we have done justice to her 
memory in this collection. 
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 See also Kimberley Brooks, editor, One Woman’s Difference: The Contributions of 
Justice Bertha Wilson (forthcoming, U.B.C. Press). 
